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Cultural Appropriation and the Arts, by James O. Young, provides an analytical,
comprehensive overview of ethical and aesthetic issues concerning cultural
appropriation. In his monograph, Young addresses important culture-related
questions such as cultural membership, ownership and responsibilities. Thinking
in aesthetic and moral categories, Young aims to identify wrong and acceptable
(objectionable vs. non-objectionable) types of cultural appropriation in the sphere of
art. He concludes that ‘cultural appropriation is aesthetically successful more often
than we are led to believe’ and that ‘cultural appropriation is wrongfully harmful or
offensive less often than some people suggest’ (p. 152).
To begin with, a distinction of the different actors involved facilitates a definition
of cultural appropriation, which is defined as the usage of items pertaining to a
certain culture (insiders) by non-members of that culture (outsiders). Young
understands the concept of culture in a very broad sense, as a collection of people
with a sufficient number of common cultural traits. His focus is limited to cases of
appropriation of culture as a whole, not when only one insider is affected. In a world
with overlapping cultures, the challenge lies in identifying who belongs to a specific
culture as well as what type of cultural items can be owned commonly and how.
Although Young recognises that cultural ownership mostly depends on the legal
regime of the particular culture, he examines this question from a philosophical
view. Young discusses whether a culture can own items such as style, patterns,
design, plots and motifs and whether these items can be freely appropriated. This
discussion is, however, not appropriate in the sense that the ownership of property
or intellectual property is lawfully restricted to individuals or a group of people, not
to a particular culture; a culture cannot own anything.
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The focus of the book is on the two main ways in which artists can appropriate
culture—tangible (object) appropriation and intangible content and subject appro-
priation (stories, styles, motifs, design; subject matter). As object appropriation does
not involve the production of new works, Young sees it as a kind of theft, while
subject appropriation implies that outsiders experience a culture as if they were
insiders, but that insiders can simultaneously continue to practice their culture.
Since moral objection against cultural appropriation can be bound to aesthetic
premises, Young examines the objectionability of an act of cultural appropriation by
an artist by discarding the aesthetic handicap thesis. He rejects the assumption that
artistic works based on appropriated content or appropriated subject matter
necessarily have aesthetic flaws. Moreover, Young criticises the idea that artists not
living within certain cultural borders or possessing respective cultural backgrounds
are not able to employ aesthetically successful content and subject matter from a
culture that is not their own. Among successful innovation appropriators, Picasso
and the Beatles are given as examples of those who re-created insiders’ content in a
stylistically distinct and aesthetically successful way different from their own.
Young assumes rightly that a successful work does not need to be produced by
insiders; rather, it depends on the artist’s experience and familiarity with techniques.
However, besides the observable aesthetical properties of an artwork, the cultural
context can also influence its aesthetical value. Influenced by Radford’s (p. 44)
authenticity argumentation, Young follows the thesis that ‘the discovery that some
painting is a forgery is not accompanied by any discovery of observable aesthetic
flaws’. Moreover, the analysis refutes that outsiders’ content and subject appropri-
ation results in inauthentic art works by identifying different sorts of authenticity,
thus ascribing authenticity to outsiders’ works, as well. Accordingly, there is no
reason to believe that outsiders are not able to produce authentic works [‘the best
biography is not always autobiography’ (p. 61)]. It should be noted that whether a
work of art by an outsider is authentic or not does not affect the aesthetic value at
all. Authenticity without aesthetic value is possible as well as is aesthetic failure of
authentic works.
After the verification that outsiders’ work can be aesthetically valuable as well,
Young turns to the analysis of cultural appropriation as theft. At first sight, this may
be surprising since he is interested in content appropriation by artists who produce
aesthetically valuable new works of art. Nevertheless, this chapter aims to explore
who should be eligible to own cultural property whilst taking different circum-
stances into account. Young’s main assertion is that styles, motifs and general plots
cannot be owned by a certain culture and that they belong to the ‘artistic commons’
(p. 66), to a humanity in which everyone is free to appropriate it. Consequentially,
he removes many obstacles from the artists’ content appropriation. While
identifying possible grounds on which artworks can belong to a culture, Young
points out that some cultures regulate the ownership of their property by laws or
traditional practices. As this can be unjust, other factors must be considered when
identifying the basis for ownership. At this stage, his analysis reaches a crucial point
as he arrives at the cultural significance principle, which he himself developed. This
could be of help when other ownership-related principles (preservation, access,
integrity and proprietary principles) are in conflict with each other as well.
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The value-providing effect of a cultural item is the basis for the claim for property.
In a cultural context, the value of an item can be anchored in aesthetic value,
historical importance, ceremonial or religious significance, or other value to the
members, who can then stake a claim to the item. Young asserts that ‘with care and
attention, it will be possible to determine how much value something has for a
culture’ (p. 93). Unfortunately, the matter is left open and no suggestions are made
on how to assess cultural value. The cultural significance principle is also only
related to tangible works due to Young’s belief that nobody can own less than a
complete expression of an artistic item.
After analysing the possibility of owning cultural items and thus the possibility of
culture-harming theft by object appropriation, Young identifies other wrongful acts
with the potential to harm or profoundly offend a culture from a moral perspective.
Among other things, the discussion of subject and content appropriation that leads
to a misrepresentation of a certain culture takes central stage. This can result in
discrimination thereafter, for instance, restricting economic opportunities of
insiders. In his view, it is unlikely that a few incompetent artists are able to
damage a culture. Although accurate representation can be morally wrong, Young
suggests that the outsider’s perspective on certain issues can also be helpful. Again,
aiming to defend the acts of cultural appropriation by artists, Young therefore
assumes that subject appropriation does not wrongfully take an audience from
insiders, since public audiences do not ‘belong’ to anyone. Acts of outsiders rather
increase the opportunities for insiders: they open the market for products, so that the
insider’s culture is not harmed due to a non-fixed demand for artworks. Further,
cultural appropriation against the assimilation threat is defended. Convincingly,
Young concludes that ‘cultural appropriation endangers a culture, not when others
borrow from it, but when its members borrow too extensively from others’ (p. 153).
His assumption that insiders have the ‘primary responsibility’ (p. 120) to keep
their culture alive is comprehensible. Although Young rightly points to instruments
available that ‘ensure that their cultures are protected’ (p. 120) from appropriation,
this is only partially valid, as, depending on a culture’s legal regime, not every
culture is able to avoid damage by copied artwork. Another important issue that
Young discusses is the simple use of aboriginal arts and crafts by non-aboriginals.
These can be profoundly offensive if the products contain a special sacred or
cultural significance. Young’s position is that not all acts of cultural appropriation
that cause profound offence are immoral. In many instances, the prima facie case
can be overcome. Likewise, an artwork can be expected to have a degree of social
value that can counterbalance the offence felt by the members of a culture from
which something has been appropriated. Moreover, freedom of expression tends to
increase social value, and as long as the appropriation of sacred designs and subjects
is part of realising artistic expression, it is not wrong.
All in all, Young claims that some content and subject appropriation can be a sort
of assault, the moral nature of which is highly questionable. But most cultural
appropriation neither interferes with the interests of individual members of cultures
nor damages cultures, if appropriate requirements regarding time and place of
cultural appropriation are respected. The suggestion is to be ‘as respectful as
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possible’, to avoid ‘unnecessary offence’ and ‘to be sensitive to the plight of
minority cultures’ (p. 141).
Capturing the problematic relationship of culture and cultural appropriation in
the modern world, where cultural claims are in the centre of many international
debates, is a challenging task. Besides successfully defining cultural concepts as
closely as possible, this book distinguishes itself by arguing in favour of removing
the majority of obstacles to innovation and the creation of new works, as they are
counterproductive. I am sceptical, however, of whether these culture-related
questions can be solved without considering the precise legal circumstances of
particular cultures; Young himself has highlighted the legal ‘morality’ of judgments
several times.
Another concern worth mentioning is that in most of the cases, Young does not
discuss the possible consequences of artists themselves seeking protection via
intellectual property rights. It would be naive to assume that artists have no
pecuniary incentives. Overall, the balance between the interests and values of
insiders and outsiders is not sufficiently recognised. Young’s emphasis on the
freedom of expression at the expense of cultural significance theory can at least be
called controversial, mostly because the social value of the new creation cannot be
clearly measured. Unfortunately, Young provides no suggestions regarding possible
alternatives.
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